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Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief
Introduction to the Problems of
Perfect Ethics in Bargaining
Scott R. Peppett
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay explores whether mindfulness squares with partisan-
ship. I must warn the reader at the outset that I will raise a poten-
tially dizzying number of difficult questions in beginning to work
through this topic, all in a very few pages. I do not provide, nor do I
have, clear answers to some of these questions. My goal is to pro-
voke, raise doubts, and begin to chart the way toward a theory of
negotiation ethics, not to argue each point extensively. That will
have to wait for another day.'
The essay is partly a response to Riskin and partly a coda. Ris-
kin explores several of the ways that mindfulness might benefit law-
yers, including reducing stress, increasing professional satisfaction,
facilitating listening, and softening the lawyer's standard adversarial
stance.2 He briefly discusses its potential impact on negotiation, sug-
gesting that mindfulness practice may make a negotiator more men-
tally agile and thus better able to manage both the tension between
creating and distributing value and the choice between adversarial
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Thanks to
Len Riskin for introducing this topic to the mainstream legal community, and for our
discussions about it while teaching together at the Michigan Conference on Dispute
Resolution. Thanks also to the organizers of the Third Annual Utah ADR Sympo-
sium, at which I developed some of these ideas. Finally, thanks to Michael Moffitt for
reading an early version of this comment.
1. I develop some of these ideas further in an article currently under develop-
ment titled Honesty and Fairness.
2. Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contribu-
tions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers and their Clients, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Riskin, Contemplative Lawyer]. See also STEVEN
KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACTICES: FINDING JoY AND SATISFACTION IN THE LEGAL LIFE
84 (1999) (discussing the benefits of mindfulness for lawyers).
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and problem-solving strategies. 3 Mindfulness, in short, will make
the negotiator more free to choose how to negotiate.
This essay suggests the opposite. Mindfulness may lead to more
deeply-held ethical commitments, which in turn may prevent some
forms of partisanship that are required for certain negotiation strate-
gies and tactics. Although mindfulness may not be the only path to
such commitments, it is our topic here and I will attempt to show that
introducing these practices to negotiators-lawyers and non-lawyers
alike-may ultimately lead them to eschew adversarial negotiation
strategies. 4 I certainly don't claim that this would be a bad thing, but
it may, for some, conflict with their vision of the lawyer's role. My
point is that the conflict is real, and that mindfulness may exacer-
bate, not resolve, it.
II. THE MINDFUL NEGOTIATOR
For brevity, I will largely assume that over time a mindful per-
son will become a more ethical person. This assumption is certainly
open to challenge, and it deserves greater exploration than I can offer
here. But I will take it as a given. Mindfulness offers a broader view
3. Riskin, Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 2, at 55 (arguing that mindfulness
permits a negotiator to hold the negotiator's dilemma "in her awareness at virtually
all points before and during a negotiation and decide, moment to moment, whether
and how to use or blend adversarial or problem-solving strategies and techniques.").
4. I must leave a related, interesting, but unfortunately altogether too broad
topic for treatment elsewhere, perhaps by others. This is the question of what ethical
challenges lawyer-negotiators who are not interested in mindfulness may face if they
negotiate on behalf of particularly ethical or mindful clients. I can see at least two
such problems. One is that these lawyers are likely to distrust the clients' mindful
states, believing perhaps that any altruism or collaboration clients say they desire
will be short-lived. These lawyers may feel duty-bound to protect their clients' inter-
ests as the lawyers understand them, even while potentially dismissing their clients'
expression of those interests. Second, lawyers may feel a need to protect their clients
from information learned from the other side. Mnookin, Tulumello and I have identi-
fied the agent's "assimilation problem"-that a principal may equate empathy with
agreement and thus fear that the agent is beginning to identify too closely with the
other side's perspective and interests. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WIN-
NING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 170 (2001). A lawyer
negotiating on behalf of a mindful client faces the opposite problem. Assuming that
the attorney interacts with the other side without the client present, the attorney will
possess private information about the other side-for example, that the other side is
deeply upset at the prospect of going to court and fears the emotional turmoil of litiga-
tion. A lawyer may fear that telling the client about the opponent's fear will lead the
client to give in too readily. As a result, the lawyer may keep information from the
client or even mislead the client about what the lawyer knows. See generally Lisa G.
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ly-
ing to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden
Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 764 (1990).
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of each experience than we normally adopt. It is a view that permits,
even requires, careful weighing of one's immediate needs or wants
against a more long-term and thoughtful consideration of one's inter-
ests. If each experience or interaction is seen in the context of one's
life as a whole and against the background of one's self-realization
instead of as a discrete transaction disconnected from one's personal
development, the costs of ethically-questionable behavior become
more salient. Deception, for example, always risks spoiling a negotia-
tion or one's relationship with the other side. From this broader per-
spective, however, deception also risks damaging one's integrity-
turning you into (or beginning to turn you into) the sort of person
that you don't want to be. Because that damage, in turn, may hinder
further self-realization and growth, the mindful person will avoid
such deceptive actions. 5 This can be the first step towards a more
ethical life-taken initially out of self-interest and the desire to pro-
gress as a person.
If one accepts this argument, it raises an obvious question: just
how far will increased awareness, attention, and focus go in terms of
strengthening one's ethical commitments? 6 Riskin seems to agree
that increased attention to ethics accompanies increased mindful-
ness. He notes that certain "positive states of mind"-such as loving-
kindness, compassion, empathy, and equanimity-tend to "develop
routinely in the course of extensive mindfulness meditation prac-
tice."'7 And in the legal context he acknowledges the possibility that
"a deeper understanding of one's own motives and a commitment to
ethical decision-making might make it difficult for some lawyers to
undertake certain activities that are widely-but not universally-
5. For two very different but equally eloquent discussions of this increasing re-
luctance to act immorally, see ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 505-25
(1981) (discussing iterative self-improvement as a path to ethical principles) and STE-
PHEN BATCHELOR, BUDDHISM WITHOUT BELIEFS 45-48 (1997) ("Our deeds, words, and
intentions create an ethical ambience that either supports or weakens resolve. If we
behave in a way that harms either others or ourselves, the capacity to focus on the
task [of mindful awakening] will be weakened."). Self-selection likely also creates a
correlation between mindfulness and ethical strength. Those who become interested
in mindfulness training may often be those who already reflect on their ethical duties
and what constitutes a good life.
6. This is not a question reserved only for those interested in mindfulness but is
instead a basic question in ethical theory. As Robert Nozick has noted, the ability to
focus attention is a fundamental component of our autonomy and a determinant of
our character and make-up over time. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 122
n.* (1989) ("What we presently focus upon is affected by what we are like, yet over the
long run a person is molded by where his or her attention continually dwells.").
7. Riskin, Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 2, at 65.
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considered essential for proper lawyering. ''8 Ultimately, however,
Riskin doubts that mindfulness will so change a lawyer as to make
the lawyer unable to pursue his client's interests as zealously as the
client might hope. He concludes that it is "quite unlikely" that mind-
fulness will make lawyers so soft that they will be unwilling to "tear
down a hostile witness in a trial, twist the facts, or otherwise push
hard enough for their clients' positions."9 A mindful lawyer, the ar-
gument goes, can still be an adversarial lawyer-and, by implication,
a mindful client can still be competitive and choose an adversarial
approach to her negotiations.
I am less sure than Riskin seems to be about this reconciliation
of mindfulness and partisanship. 10 One can imagine that the prac-
tices Riskin describes might have a far more significant impact on a
person's ethical commitments, whether lawyer or non-lawyer, than
he seems to admit. To explore this possibility, imagine that, at the
extreme, a diligent mindfulness practitioner might eventually reach
a state of complete dedication to an ethical life. I will call this person
a "saint" because she adopts a more conscientious stance toward her
relations with the world and others than most of us will ever
achieve." Our saint would also have to be sufficiently strong-willed
to live up to her moral commitments. She must have developed her-
self to the point that the contingencies of her life-her history, at-
tachments, psychology, and emotions-no longer lead her to act
against these deeply-held beliefs. She is so mindful as to be some-
what frightening.
What sort of ethical commitments would our saint adopt? For
the sake of argument, I will assert that at the very least such a per-
son would commit to both honesty and fairness, resolving neither to
deceive nor to take advantage of other human beings 12 for her own
8. Riskin, Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 2, at 64.
9. Id.
10. To be fair, Riskin's article is not devoted to this topic, and thus it is hard to
know what his considered opinion would be on the matter. I have tried to assemble
his position on mindfulness, ethics, and the lawyer's role as best I can.
11. For the purposes of this essay I make no reference to religious canons regard-
ing the qualifications for sainthood. The "saint" here is merely an extremely aware,
moral person.
12. One can question whether such a commitment should be limited to human
beings instead of all forms of sentient life, as have both serious ethicists and various
religious figures. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICs 55 (1993); PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975). Because I focus here on negotiation, I will ignore the
question of the ethical treatment of non-human life.
[Vol. 7:83
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ends 13 and to respect and take others' interests into account. 14 There
is good reason to believe that a very mindful person would adopt such
a saintly view of life. Even without turning extensively to religious
doctrine, one can imagine that our saint would be consistently non-
partisan when it came to her own and others' interests.15 The saint
would realize, as the philosopher Henry Sidgwick put it, that "[t]he
good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of
view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other."
16
Thomas Nagel calls this an "objective" viewpoint: one that is removed
from the individual's own interests.' 7 It is a view most often associ-
ated with R.M. Hare, who described such non-partisan principles as
"universalizable." Hare argued that an ethical imperative must be
universalizable in the sense that it recommends an action regardless
13. There are various justifications for deceit, such as to save a life or serve some
other moral end. Here I refer to self-interested deceit designed merely to further one's
own welfare. This does not do justice to the complexities of this topic but will have to
do for now.
14. These various commitments are not necessarily connected. One might decide
not to deceive or manipulate but not take the further step of affirmatively committing
to take others' substantive interests into account. For our purposes here, however, I
will assume that our saint adopts both sorts of principles.
15. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 112 (1979) ("[Mloral equality at-
tempt[s] to give equal weight, in essential respects, to each person's point of view.
This might even be described as the mark of an enlightened ethic . . .
16. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 382 (7th ed. 1992).
17. According to Nagel, "A view or form of thought is more objective than another
if it relies less on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or
on the character of the particular type of creature he is .... We may think of reality as
a set of concentric spheres, progressively revealed as we detach gradually from the
contingencies of the self." THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 5 (1986). Rawls
adopts a similar, though not identical, viewpoint when he reasons from behind his
famous "veil of ignorance." See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971) ("Some-
how we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and
tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.").
The legal system too rests on an ideal of "blind justice," impartial as between persons
irrespective of their individual characteristics. See SIDGWICK, supra note 16, at 380
(discussing parallel between the universal point of view and this legal ideal). Indeed,
there is an odd similarity here to what Dean Anthony Kronman has called "that pecu-
liar bifocality" that law students acquire through the case method in law school,
which he describes as a "forcing ground for the moral imagination" because it requires
the law student to "disengage himself from the sympathetic attachments he may have
formed" and see things from multiple perspectives. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER 113 (1993). Of course, not all (Kronman included) agree that law school
serves as a place for moral development. See, e.g., BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE
LAW 50-51 (1994) (describing how the case method leads to a sort of "false
individuality").
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of the perspective or contingencies of the actor."1 If I think it is mor-
ally acceptable for me to torture you, I must also think it is acceptable
for you to torture me. 19 As I am unlikely to accept this, freedom to
torture is a poor candidate for a moral imperative. This thinking ulti-
mately leads us to a commitment to consider others' interests.
20
Somewhat like Kant, Hare explains that "if we are trying to univer-
salize our maxims, we shall try to further the ends of other people on
equal terms with ourselves, treating them as if they were our own
ends."
21
Is there reason to believe that mindfulness will lead to this sort
of moral perspective-taking? This is an empirical claim, and one that
I can neither substantiate nor refute. But it is plausible, or at least
plausible enough to deserve attention. Riskin notes that mindfulness
training can help to loosen up a practitioner's attachment to self and
ego. 22 As a practitioner looks deeper into the nature of his own and
others' conditions, his own life, interests and position may become
less primary and others' interests more salient. This, in turn, may
permit more compassion, empathy and concern for others' well being.
Mindfulness may, in short, allow him to "know" others' experiences or
perspectives-know what it is like to be them, in their unique condi-
tion-in a way previously unavailable to him. (One cannot, of course,
ever know another's experience in an ultimate sense or in the way
18. See generally R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING chs. 5-6 (1981); R.M. HARE, FREE-
DOM AND REASON 94 (1963) ("All that is essential ... is that B should disregard the
fact that he plays the particular role in the situation which he does, without disre-
garding the inclinations which people have in situations of this sort. In other words,
he must be prepared to give weight to A's inclinations and interests as if they were his
own."). See also R.M. Hare, Arguing About Rights, 33 EMORY L.J. 631, 636 (1984).
19. See R.M. HARE, OBJECTIVE PRESCRIPTIONS AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (1999) (dis-
cussing the torture example).
20. Negotiation scholars have long advocated taking others' interests into ac-
count. See generally FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 59 (2d ed. 1991). Such perspec-
tive-taking permits creative problem-solving and more efficient negotiation. My
argument here, however, suggests that putting yourself in the other person's shoes
may actually be a moral imperative, not merely a pragmatic prescription. I hope to
develop this idea more fully in forthcoming work.
21. R.M. HARE, supra note 19, at 14.
22. See Riskin, Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 2, at 56. Nozick has ques-
tioned whether meditative insight into the unreality of the self or ego is valid. See
NozIcK, supra note 6, at 142 (noting that "observational support for the no-self view is
rooted within Buddhist meditative practice" but that "this practice also is guided by
the doctrine itself-part of the practice consists in meditating on various pieces of the
doctrine-so the reports of what gets observed are themselves to some degree a prod-
uct of the theory already held, hence somewhat contaminated"). This does not mean,
as Nozick points out, that such insights are therefore incorrect; merely that they are
not entirely dependable. See id.
[Vol. 7:83
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that one knows the taste of broccoli. Although you might observe or
reflect upon another person endlessly, you will never observe from
the outside-in what it is like to be that person from the inside-out.
23
But perhaps we don't need such perfect knowledge to ground moral
commitments. One can approximate, and it seems reasonable that
one's approximation, though never perfect, becomes more accurate to
the extent that we can weaken the grip of our own partisan
perspective.)
Assuming such perspective-taking occurs, will it lead to our
saint's basic commitments to honesty and fairness? I acknowledge
that this is a big leap, indeed the biggest leap in this essay. To say
that moral imperatives are universalizable does not tell you the con-
tent of those imperatives. Arguing for (or even defining) honesty and
fairness, however, is beyond my reach or ability here. I must simply
assert that both are sufficiently fundamental, and sufficiently deriva-
ble from this sort of moral perspective-taking (or from other sorts of
reasoning about morals), to attribute to our saint.
24
To recap, our first proposition is that a more mindful person will
likely become a more ethical person. Second, she will become more
ethical in a particular way-that is, by committing to a less partisan,
more universal perspective. In the negotiation context this change
will likely lead her at least to commit (a) not to deceive or manipulate
others, given that she would not want to be deceived or manipulated,
and (b) to try to respect and take others' interests into account as she
would expect others to take her interests into account.
23. See generally Zeno Vendler, Changing Places?, in HARE AND CRITICS 171
(Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988); Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like To Be a Bat?,
reprinted in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 168 (1979).
24. There is certainly disagreement about the role of lies and their justification.
For an excellent treatment, see William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of
Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 435-36 (1999) (arguing for
a contextual approach to lying instead of a categorical one). For a useful discussion of
manipulation and deception, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER 296-
302 (1998). Scanlon's contractualism is but one example of an approach that might
lead to such commitments through rational analysis even without mindful insight or
perspective-taking. See id. at 191 (arguing that contractualism "gives us a direct rea-
son to be concerned with other people's points of view: not because we might, for all
we know, actually be them, or because we might occupy their position in some other
possible world, but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason to
accept"). The most well-known modern discussion of deception is SISSELA Boa, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 31 (1978) (arguing that lies may only be
justified as a last resort). For the most often discussed categorical bar on lying, see
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 225-26 (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
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Few of us, of course, are likely to achieve sainthood in the sense
described here. I do not think, however, that this failure, if it is one,
will be due to our rejecting these basic principles of honesty and fair-
ness. I believe that most reflective people, including mindfulness
practitioners, will arrive at these commitments. More likely, the fail-
ure will result from a lack of will, or, put differently, from an inability
to realize consistently the principles because of our being rooted in an
individual life, at a certain time, in a certain setting. The challenges
of life are jarring; we do not always respond to them as we know we
should.
Nevertheless, all of this suggests that perhaps Riskin under-
states the effect that mindfulness practice will have on the choice of
negotiation strategies. Although Riskin suggests that mindfulness
will better equip negotiators to apply either problem-solving or more
adversarial strategies "moment to moment,"25 a more likely effect, I
think, is that mindful negotiators will abandon a truly competitive
approach to negotiation. It will no longer be morally responsible to,
as Riskin describes it, "mislead the other side,"26 or perhaps even to
ascribe to the basic tenets of what Riskin calls the "lawyer's standard
philosophical map."27 Negotiators will not only have pragmatic rea-
sons to search for integrative, value-creating solutions to a problem;
they will have moral reasons as well.28 They not only ought to prob-
lem-solve because it is good practical advice but also because it would
be wrong not to.
This is true, I think, of both the saint and the more humble nov-
ice to mindfulness. Indeed, negotiation and strategic interaction may
be a perfect testing ground for a mindfulness practitioner's new-
found ethical aspirations. Moreover, negotiation presents these
moral choices in a foreseeable and easily recognizable way. It is a
salient context with obvious ethical import. Although a saint may
practice discernment and equanimity regardless of situation, and
may not need context to provide a warning, many more of us will
welcome the reminder to be mindful of our behavior.
25. See Riskin, Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 2, at 55.
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id. at 13.
28. See generally NozIcK, supra note 5, at 542-45 (discussing whether cooperat-





Adversarial bargaining is common in legal negotiations. One
study of civil litigation in New Jersey found that litigators thought
that "positional" bargaining was used in seventy-one percent of the
cases and problem-solving was used in approximately sixteen per-
cent. 29 This suggests that a mindful negotiator committed to honesty
and fairness-and thus to certain forms of problem-solving instead of
adversarial bargaining-would be in a distinct minority. But what,
exactly, would such a negotiator be required to forego to adhere to our
basic commitments to honesty and fairness?
Many common "hard bargaining" tactics derive their power
largely from deception.30 Making an arbitrary and inflated demand,
advocating an issue that one does not really care about in order to
create a "bargaining chip," or making a threat that one does not in-
tend to carry out are all intended to induce action by another person
through distortion.31 These tactics conflict with a basic moral com-
mitment to honesty. Similarly, extreme variants of commitment tac-
tics, 32 good cop/bad cop, or personal attacks may be suspect because
of the underlying purpose of denigrating or circumventing the other
person's interests in order to better satisfy one's own.
Certain positive legal permissions to bend the truth in negotia-
tions may also seem less important in the face of a general moral
commitment to honesty or fairness. The law of fraud, for example,
distinguishes between misrepresentations of fact and misrepresenta-
tions of mere opinion. "Bluffing" and "puffing" are permissible; fac-
tual misrepresentations are not.33 Likewise, the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit certain
29. See Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Liti-
gation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want," 12
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 253, 255 (1997).
30. See Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. oF DiSF.
RES. 325, 346-48 (reviewing hard bargaining tactics); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-
Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 48-52
(1985) (same); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1987) (discussing various tactics and ultimately condemning all forms of deception in
bargaining).
31. One might even take the position that exaggerated arguments about the
state of the law-arguments too abstracted from existing law to be justified-consti-
tute lies. See Robert F. Nagel, Lies and Law, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 605, 605
(1999) (discussing "the intriguing but distressing question of whether an individual
who claims to be speaking like a lawyer ought to be understood to be lying").
32. See Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay On Bargaining, in SCHELLING, THE STRAT-
EGY OF CONFLICT 22-28 (1960) (giving the classic description of commitment tactics).
33. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Deal-
ing With Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 36 (2000)
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sorts of misrepresentations in negotiation. Model Rule 4.1 states
that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person, nor fail to disclose a material fact to a
third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client's
criminal or fraudulent act (subject to the constraints of Rule 1.6 gov-
erning client confidences). 34 The Comment to Rule 4.1, however, per-
mits certain forms of exaggeration and misrepresentation-
regarding "[e]stimates of price or value placed on the subject of a
transaction" or "a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of
a claim." 35 In short, it is acceptable for a lawyer to misrepresent a
client's reservation price or intentions regarding what constitutes an
acceptable settlement.
One might believe that a lawyer negotiator is morally justified in
telling such lies about reservation price even if a non-lawyer negotia-
tor is not.36 And one could argue about whether these legal distinc-
tions align sufficiently with moral reasoning;37 what "honesty" and
"fairness" require is certainly intricate. Even without bringing these
basic duties into such detailed focus, however, the point remains: be-
coming more mindful may restrict a negotiator's freedom to adopt
what might otherwise be considered acceptable, even if somewhat
"sharp," approaches to bargaining.
IV. OBJECTIONS
I can imagine many objections to this brief argument. One is
that arriving at ethical principles of this sort is a task in which we all
engage already, or should, so long as we are reflective about how to
live. Mindful awareness is not required for moral acuity-traditional
practical reasoning about what morality requires will do the job. I
actually agree with this argument, but I don't think that it detracts
(discussing the distinction between, and common justifications for, bluffing and
puffing).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a)-(b) (1999).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (1999).
36. See Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness
of Fraud, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1544 (1998) (relying on Benjamin Constant's argu-
ments that certain lies-particularly lies about reservation values-are morally per-
missible because telling the truth is only required when the recipient has a right to
the truth, which a counterpart in negotiation may not); id. at 1567 (concluding that
"lies that sophisticated lawyers tell each other about their reservation prices in cer-
tain circumstances may not be wrong in any relevant way").
37. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How




much from the discussion here. Increased awareness of self and cir-
cumstance may facilitate such reasoning, even if it is not necessary.
And it may lead most mindfulness practitioners toward these ethical
principles even if others could also arrive there independently.
A second objection is that our saint-or even any negotiator es-
pousing the saint's ethic (though perhaps not living up to it consist-
ently)-simply cannot be described accurately as "negotiating."
Honest bargaining that takes all interests seriously is not really bar-
gaining, it's something else, because deception, the argument goes, is
inherent to negotiation. 38 James White has stated, for example, that
"[t]o conceal one's true position, to mislead an opponent about one's
true settling point, is the essence of negotiation. '39 Walter Steele put
a point on this argument with the following hypothetical:
Consider the negotiating standards of two holy men, one a will-
ing buyer and the other a willing seller. If their personal com-
mitments to holiness prevented them from making the slightest
misrepresentation or from engaging in any abuse of their bar-
gaining positions, how would the ultimate outcome of their ne-
gotiations differ from the outcome achieved by two lawyer
negotiators? If deceit truly is inherent to negotiation, the out-
come achieved by the holy men could not be defined as the prod-
uct of a negotiation.
40
Not everyone agrees with this characterization, 41 but it is cer-
tainly common. Perhaps the best example of this sort of thinking is,
38. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 142-43
(1982) ("Such posturing is part of the game."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's
Obligation to be Trustworthy when Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REV. 2,
181 (1981).
39. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 927-28 (1980) (arguing, ultimately, that
certain forms of deception in negotiation are immoral, even if not illegal).
40. Walter W. Steele, Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1387, 1390-91 (1986). Steele goes on to say "But if the results achieved by
their methods are somehow better or fairer than the result achieved by lawyers, then
perhaps the legal definition of negotiation should be changed." Id. at 1391. 1 will
return to this question about the lawyer's role below. See infra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
41. See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating With Re-
spect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 743 (2001) ("[T]he act of negotiation does not
relieve one of the moral duty to respect others."); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truth-
seeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1994); ARTHUR ISAK
APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFES-
SIONAL LIFE 104-08, 113-20 (1999) (arguing against the notion that negotiation re-
quires or legitimizes deception). Some have also argued that lawyers should be fair in
their negotiations, although this is a less common position. See Alvin B. Rubin, A
Causerie on Lawyers'Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 580 (1975); Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669,
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again, Model Rule 4.1's permission of misrepresentations about res-
ervation price. 42 According to the Rule's Comments, misleading
statements of this sort are permitted because "[u]nder generally ac-
cepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordina-
rily are not taken as statements of material fact. '43 Although the
Rules do not say so explicitly, this Comment seems to imply that bar-
ring all types of misrepresentation would demand too much-it
would make negotiation as we normally understand it impossible.
I disagree with this view, both as expressed in Steele's hypotheti-
cal and in the Comment to Model Rule 4.1. Although many negotia-
tors may deceive and manipulate, I see nothing that requires one to
do so, nor do I think that one can be effective only by doing so. Nego-
tiation requires parties to manage different and sometimes conflict-
ing interests to determine whether a jointly-created outcome can be
found that is more satisfying than any self-help alternative. 44 Two
saints could honestly disclose their alternatives and reservation val-
ues, their interests and priorities, and still face a variety of challeng-
ing decisions regarding how best to maximize achievable joint gain
and divide the pie. 45 Even for the enlightened there would likely be
no easy answer as to whether to give more of the economic surplus in
a transaction to the person who needed it more, wanted it more, or
deserved it more. Two saints might disagree about how to classify a
used car in the "blue book" scheme, or about when an employment
agreement should vest an executive's stock options. I see no reason
to redescribe their interaction over these matters as something other
than negotiation merely because they chose to avoid dishonesty or
manipulation.
I must make one caveat, however. One can imagine a person
who becomes so universal in her views-so detached from the partic-
ulars of her individual position-that she no longer values her own
interests at all. Her only interest becomes to serve others' interests.
679 (1978) ("When acting in a nonadvocate capacity ... a lawyer must ... [refrain
from] unfair, unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, means ... [or pursuing]
unfair, unconscionable, or unjust, though not unlawful, ends[.]").
42. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (1999).
44. See DAVID A. LAx & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 11
(1986) (defining negotiation).
45. The saints would still face, for example, the problem that there are some-
times tradeoffs between "fair" division and efficiencies or value-creation. See, e.g.,
STEVEN J. BRAMs & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CuTTING TO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1996); STEVEN J. BRAMs & ALAN D. TAYLOR, THE WIN-WIN SOLUTION:




Although it is difficult to imagine how two such people could interact
(wouldn't they merely circle each other endlessly, each trying to help
the other?), I think the introduction of even one such person into
what would otherwise be a negotiation does require redescription of
the interaction as something other than bargaining. In this extreme
circumstance there would not be two people with differing or conflict-
ing interests; only one with interests and another with a desire to
serve. There would be nothing to negotiate about-person A would
express needs and person B would satisfy them to the best of B's
ability.
Finally, one might object that lawyers have a duty to compete. If
a lawyer refuses to do so because of ethical commitments that include
consideration of an opponent's interests, then even if we cannot
redescribe that lawyer's interactions as something other than negoti-
ation, perhaps we should simply decide that the person can no longer
be a lawyer. Robert Condlin, for example, has written that lawyers
"must use any legally available move or procedure helpful to a client's
bargaining position. Among other things, this means that all forms
of leverage must be exploited, inflated demands made, and private
information obtained and used whenever any of these actions would
advance the client's stated objectives .... ,,46 If negotiating lawyers
will not play the game, they should be disqualified as players.
Although it opens yet another difficult line of argument, I think
it unlikely that a saint, or even just a very reflective person, would
decide, like Condlin, to prioritize client loyalty over the saint's al-
ready-discussed ethical commitments. As Riskin explains, mindful-
ness loosens one's attachments-one's loyalties. This is, again, what
suggests that these practices might aid in adopting a more universal
perspective on moral questions. 47 It also suggests, however, that a
loyalty-driven ethic, peculiar to one's particular duties to a particular
client, will be relatively unpersuasive to our saint as compared to the
basic obligations to honesty and fairness.
48
46. Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 71 (1992) (citations omitted).
47. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
48. See generally, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: RE-
FORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53-58 (2000) (discussing the basic premises of parti-
sanship and arguing that the most common justifications for the advocate's role
"unravel at several key points"); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THE-
ORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY (1988); DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETH-
ICS (1984); William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" About Ethical Questions, 27
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1998).
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V. CONCLUSION
Luckily, however, I need not resolve these matters here. This
discussion of role ends the essay exactly as I set out-illustrating the
complexity of Riskin's introduction of mindfulness to legal negotia-
tion. Although I have made many assumptions, my general point is
simple. Increasing one's awareness has ethical consequences. One
becomes, over time, a different sort of person. And that sort of person
may no longer wish to engage in certain negotiation strategies.
Rather than becoming more free, moment-to-moment, to choose a ne-
gotiation approach, a mindful negotiator may constrain himself, lim-
iting his freedom of action in deference to his ethical commitments.
And this, particularly for lawyers, may chafe against the lawyer's un-
derstanding-or others' understanding-of the lawyer's role.
